Moral expertise revisited.

In recent years, there has been a lively (bio-)ethical debate on the nature of moral expertise and the concept of moral experts. However, there is currently no common ground concerning most issues. Against this background, this paper has two main goals. First, in more general terms, it examines some of the problems concerning moral expertise and experts, with a special focus on moral advice and testimony. Second, it applies the results in the context of medical ethics, especially in the clinical setting. By situating the debate in the clinical setting, one arrives at some important conclusions to better understand the relevant concepts and vital problems in the general discussion on moral expertise and the requirements of who counts as a moral expert.

Building Moral Robots: Ethical Pitfalls and Challenges.

This paper examines the ethical pitfalls and challenges that non-ethicists, such as researchers and programmers in the fields of computer science, artificial intelligence and robotics, face when building moral machines. Whether ethics is "computable" depends on how programmers understand ethics in the first place and on the adequacy of their understanding of the ethical problems and methodological challenges in these fields. Researchers and programmers face at least two types of problems due to their general lack of ethical knowledge or expertise. The first type is so-called rookie mistakes, which could be addressed by providing these people with the necessary ethical knowledge. The second, more difficult methodological issue concerns areas of peer disagreement in ethics, where no easy solutions are currently available. This paper examines several existing approaches to highlight the ethical pitfalls and challenges involved. Familiarity with these and similar problems can help programmers to avoid pitfalls and build better moral machines. The paper concludes that ethical decisions regarding moral robots should be based on avoiding what is immoral (i.e. prohibiting certain immoral actions) in combination with a pluralistic ethical method of solving moral problems, rather than relying on a particular ethical approach, so as to avoid a normative bias.

Indignity and Old Age.

This article examines the nature of human dignity against the background of old age and introduces the novel idea of treating human dignity as a formal principle related to the more foundational notion of indignity. The discussion starts with the objection that the notion of human dignity can be used to justify contrary positions and is therefore inconclusive. This pitfall can be averted by appealing to the notion of indignity rather than dignity in one's moral reasoning and decision-making. Cases of indignity are more primary and indicate the violation of the very core of a human being. The verifiable property of vulnerability is central to this identification of indignity, as is illustrated by reference to the experiences of elderly people. The article argues for applying the concept of human dignity to reverse the conditions that existed before a particular indignity emerged, rather than trying to define positively the notion of human dignity in the first place.

Reconciling female genital circumcision with universal human rights.

One of the most challenging issues in cross-cultural bioethics concerns the long-standing socio-cultural practice of female genital circumcision (FGC), which is prevalent in many African countries and the Middle East as well as in some Asian and Western countries. It is commonly assumed that FGC, in all its versions, constitutes a gross violation of the universal human rights of health, physical integrity, and individual autonomy and hence should be abolished. This article, however, suggests a mediating approach according to which one form of FGC, the removal of the clitoris foreskin, can be made compatible with the high demands of universal human rights. The argument presupposes the idea that human rights are not absolutist by nature but can be framed in a meaningful, culturally sensitive way. It proposes important limiting conditions that must be met for the practice of FGC to be considered in accordance with the human rights agenda.

Moral philosophers are moral experts! A reply to David Archard.

In his article 'Why Moral Philosophers Are Not and Should Not Be Moral Experts' David Archard attempts to show that his argument from common-sense morality is more convincing than other competing arguments in the debate. I examine his main line of argumentation and eventually refute his main argument in my reply.

Is inclusive education a human right?

In this article, I question the general idea that inclusive education--i.e., to teach all students in one class--is a moral human right. The following discussion shows that the widespread view in disability studies that there is a moral human right to inclusive education can be reasonably called into question by virtue of the proposed counter arguments, but without denying that inclusive education is of utmost importance. Practically speaking, the legal human right to inclusive education is of great practical value for impaired students, and for their basic right to be free from discrimination in education, since their concern thereby gains great legal and moral force. But, theoretically speaking, this particular human right lacks an attainable consensus concerning proper moral justification.

Global ethics and principlism.

This article examines the special relation between common morality and particular moralities in the four-principles approach and its use for global ethics. It is argued that the special dialectical relation between common morality and particular moralities is the key to bridging the gap between ethical universalism and relativism. The four-principles approach is a good model for a global bioethics by virtue of its ability to mediate successfully between universal demands and cultural diversity. The principle of autonomy (i.e., the idea of individual informed consent), however, does need to be revised so as to make it compatible with alternatives such as family- or community-informed consent. The upshot is that the contribution of the four-principles approach to global ethics lies in the so-called dialectical process and its power to deal with cross-cultural issues against the background of universal demands by joining them together.

Applying the four-principle approach.

The four-principle approach to biomedical ethics is used worldwide by practitioners and researchers alike but it is rather unclear what exactly people do when they apply this approach. Ranking, specification, and balancing vary greatly among different people regarding a particular case. Thus, a sound and coherent applicability of principlism seems somewhat mysterious. What are principlists doing? The article examines the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the applicability of this approach. The most important result is that a sound and comprehensible application of the four principles is additionally ensured by making use of the organizing meta-principle of common morality, which is the starting point and constraining framework of moral reasoning.